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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

United States Mission Berlin,
Berlin, Germany,
January 15, 1969.

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Dear Eleanor: E Guf

As a result of the special pressures that have been on us lately, such a mass of papers has accumulated in my file of things held pending dictation that I do not really know where I stand on my correspondence. Forgive me, therefore, for having gone so long without writing to you. I am not precisely sure how long I have owed or whether I owe you a letter, but want to get off some ideas and send you some copies of memoranda, etc. There are enclosed a memorandum from Ed Doherty that was drafted by Frank Taylor on FY 1959 aid allocation and a memorandum from Chuck Blackman on projects for Berlin, both of which should be of interest to you.

Thank you for your support on Green Week. We are certainly happy that we are again going to participate. Our participation will be well worth all the cost and trouble.

Have you heard anything more about your proposal to send Fred Scheven to Berlin? It is an excellent one, and we assume that ICA has gone rapidly ahead with arrangements for it. Nearly a month has elapsed since you wrote about this matter, and we expect that any day now news will come that Fred is en route here or about to depart. Incidentally, Fred himself wrote at considerable length on December 24 to say that if he had foreseen present developments he would not have left his post in Berlin. He added that when he left Berlin he felt that he could be easily and quickly replaced, and went on to say "if you, as my friend and as a representative of my government, should feel there is again a job for me to do in Berlin and should ask me to return, I would not turn down the request." I replied that I had received a letter from you indicating the likelihood that he would be returned to Berlin. I added that I had immediately replied to you thanking you for the suggestion and indicating how fine it would be to have him here again for at least a few months. His return here would have an excellent effect on morale in precisely the circles where the maintenance of good morale is vital to the normal operation of the Berlin economy.

(V) Mrs. Eleanor Lansing Dulles,
Office of German Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

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(Signed) Bernice Guffler

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
The Germans are continuing to press very hard for increases in the stockpile. The French and British, incidentally, are also pressuring us. None of them can seem to understand the reasons for Washington's delay in coming to a decision on this matter. I don't know what the reason is myself. If it is hesitation to tie up funds in stockpile commodities, could this matter not be resolved by giving consent to purchase additional stockpile commodities on the understanding that those not needed for further stockpiling after the crisis is over could be sold, so that the capital invested in them could again be turned back into liquid funds?

It would be fine if Washington could soon come to a decision so that we can get under way in this matter. Incidentally, it might be of interest to you that people are beginning to say that one great shame about losing Berlin to the Soviets or the Pankow regime would be that the Communists would thus acquire a lot of fine buildings and other useful property and that this may be one reason they would like to grab West Berlin. If a decision is taken not to increase the stockpiles or to do so only on a minimal basis, this same line of reasoning might be followed to the conclusion that we Americans are getting ready to cut our losses and do not want to have too much in the way of stockpile goods fall into Russian hands.

The Berlin Germans, West Germans, British and French are for once absolutely unanimous in a feeling that the stockpile should be increased, and increased as soon as possible, as a measure of common prudence. It is simply impossible to find any arguments that have any effect in countering their strong feelings in this respect. They feel that what they describe as this natural measure of common prudence should be taken regardless of what Allied policy toward Berlin may otherwise be, unless we intend to abandon the city and do not want additional material to fall into Soviet hands. The longer this matter is discussed the more ideas the other four elements concerned think up. The more time they have to think, the more they tend to come forward with what constitutes in their minds evidence that this or that stockpile level was set too low in the first place.

I am very happy to be able to say that I am continuing to find grounds to admire the Berliners. The coolness with which they are going about their everyday lives is simply marvelous. There is no sign of panic, no sign of undue worry, and every indication that the population of this city is determined to stand firm. Things are going, in that respect, as well as even the most optimistic of us could have hoped. This coolness and outward confidence is founded on a conviction that we Americans will find some solution to the problem and will not let Berlin down. It is accompanied, however, with some very real concern. We must recognize that as a fact. People again and again come to members of the Mission

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and seek occasion to be reassured that we will really stand firm. We always give them this assurance. They also try to find out whether we will force our way through on the surface, resort to a small airlift to support our own troops provided German ground traffic is not interrupted, and resort to a full-scale airlift in case the city is in any way blockaded. Such questions are beginning to be quite frequent and are probably natural. We dodge them or indicate that, in so far as we may know what our plans are, we are not at liberty to disclose them; or in some way get out of committing ourselves. As a matter of actual fact, none of us here knows how far we have thought through the method by which we intend to implement our intention to stand firm in terms of actual practical working policy.

In any event, I am happy to be able to say that at this stage, with about four months and ten days left of the six-month period the Russian ultimatum has given to Berlin, the Berliners are still to a most commendable degree keeping up their courage, and giving no evidences of panic by any of their political or economic actions.

I hope that at an early date we will be hearing from Washington regarding Fred Scheven, the stockpile, and some of the other outstanding current problems.

Thank you.

Gretchen joins me in best wishes.

Sincerely,



Bernard Gufler

Enclosures:

1. Mr. Doherty's memorandum
2. 2 copies of Mr. Blackman's memorandum

Copy to:

Mr. Hillenbrand, Department.

